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Typical examples of cultural phenomena all exhibit a degree of similarity across time and 
space at the level of the population. As such, a fundamental question for any science of cul-
ture is, what ensures this stability in the first place? Here we focus on the evolutionary and 
stabilizing role of ‘                         ’  in which one item causes the production of 
another item whose form tends to deviate from the original in a directed, non-random way. 
We present a series of stochastic models of cultural evolution investigating its effects. Re-
sults show that cultural stability can emerge and be maintained by virtue of convergent 
transformation alone, in the absence of any form of copying or selection process. We show 
how high-fidelity copying and convergent transformation need not be opposing forces, and 
can jointly contribute to cultural stability. We finally analyse how non-random transfor-
mation and high-fidelity copying can have different evolutionary signatures at population 
level, and hence how their distinct effects can be distinguished in empirical records. Collec-
tively, these results supplement existing approaches to cultural evolution based on the 
Darwinian analogy, while also providing formal support for other frameworks — such as 
Cultural Attraction Theory — that entail its further loosening. 
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Introduction 
The richness and diversity of human cultures has been long documented by anthropologists 
(Benedict, 1934; Murdock, 1981; Brown, 1991; Ember et al., 1998), and biologists have ob-
served and described behavioural traditions in several non-human species (Whiten et al., 
1999; Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Laland and Galef, 2009; Danchin et al., 2018; Aplin, 
2019). In attempting to synthesise these findings and hence explain culture in a naturalistic 
way, a recurrent source of inspiration and insight has been the analogy with biological, Dar-
winian evolution (Gerard et al., 1956; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Mesoudi, 2011; Lewens, 
2015). In this perspective, culture is a population-level phenomenon consisting of items that 
are “          d repeatedly through social or observational learning to become a popula-
tion-level  h            ” (Whiten et al., 1999, p.682) and “ x    in identifiable form over ex-
tended periods of ti  ” ( ’B     et al., 2010). As such, a key question is, under what cir-
cumstances can behaviour and information that is socially transmitted exhibit some degree 
of population-level stability over time? 
 One widespread hypothesis, inspired by the Darwinian model, is that relatively sta-
ble cultural phenomena are maintained by psychological mechanisms able to copy cultural 
items with a sufficiently high degree of fidelity, acting in effect as a cultural inheritance sys-
tem (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985). This hypothesis helped to shape the study of cultural 
evolution (e.g. “                 … allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviours and 
           … this fidelity serve[s] to prevent information     … and  h  … form[s] the basis 
for cultural          ”, Tomasello et al., 1993, p.495), and it persists to this day, including in 
influential overviews of the field (e.g. “I  order for a behaviour to become traditional, it 
must be           d… without any significant loss of   d     ”, Mesoudi, 2011, p.193). Some 
researchers argue that the stability of cultural traditions is further supported by selective 
transmission biases, such as social learning strategies that cause some cultural models being 
preferentially copied from than others (e.g. Laland, 2004; Kendal et al., 2018). As such, 
when mechanisms for high-fidelity copying are absent or play a lesser role, some other sta-
bilizing selection mechanism is present instead (see Henrich and Boyd, 2002 for a formal 
implementation of this approach). In sum, much existing research is built on tacit assump-
tions that copying and/or selection are necessary to maintain cultural stability. The over-
whelming majority of formal models in cultural evolution assume that culture is realized 
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though repeated “            ”  and transmission is a process based on copying and selec-
tion.   
 Here we consider whether stability can emerge and persist in an evolutionary system 
without high-fidelity copying or selection. In other words, we examine whether the evolu-
tionary behaviour of a system governed by copying and selection can also be obtained by 
other means. If it were clearly established that neither copying nor selection is necessary, 
that would undermine some existing foundational assumptions about the range of ways in 
which cultural stability can be ensured across time and space. This would in turn open the 
door for other frameworks for the naturalisation of culture, which might either complement 
or challenge the presently dominant approaches. 
We focus in particular on the role of ‘         t               ’  in which one item 
causes the production of another item whose form tends to deviate from that of the original 
item in a non-random way (see also Claidière et al., 2018). This is a minimal and abstract no-
tion, defined in functional terms, i.e. it specifies only a relationship between inputs and out-
puts. As such, convergent transformation can be realised in many different ways. We elabo-
rate this notion conceptually—and the related notion of ‘         ’—in the next section. 
Having elaborated the key notions of stability and convergent transformation, we 
present three formal models, providing evidence for three main findings. (1) Stability over 
time at the population level can be achieved through different processes (an example of 
equifinality in cultural systems, Barrett, 2019). In particular, stability can emerge and be 
maintained by virtue of convergent transformation alone, in the absence of any form of 
copying or selection process. (2) As processes, high-fidelity copying and convergent trans-
formation can be complementary in bringing about stability at the population level, but it is 
convergent transformation, even if weak, that drives this effect if high-fidelity copying is not 
also accompanied by selection. (3) While selective high-fidelity copying and convergent 
transformation can both produce stability at the population level (either separately or joint-
ly), the underlying processes can be empirically distinguished through different evolutionary 
signatures, identified at the level of the population. 
Following the models, we describe the implications of these for fundamental issues 
in the naturalisation of culture. In particular, we argue that while high-fidelity transmission 
and selection processes can serve as causes of cultural stability, they are not necessary 
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causes. More broadly, we certainly do not reject the Darwinian model for culture en bloc, 
but we do argue that the possible high importance of convergent transformations, as means 
of maintaining cultural stability, is a disanalogy with important consequences for causal ex-
planation. 
 
Cultural stability and convergent transformation 
Characteristic examples of culturally stable phenomena are many. They include, for in-
stance,  h  d   ’  games (some of which have remained stable for remarkably long periods 
of time, despite relatively fast turnover of the individuals playing them; Morin, 2015), lan-
guages (some parts of which barely change for centuries; and those parts that do change do 
so slowly enough for individuals of different generations to retain mutual comprehensibil-
ity), and many technologies and other artefacts (one famous example is the Acheulean 
hand-axe, the canonical form of which remained unchanged for hundreds of thousands of 
years). What these and other examples show is how traditions can remain the same over 
long periods of time, often in the face of ecological change. The term ‘                ’ is 
sometimes given to such examples, in which the items in question—not only games, parts of 
language, or material artefacts; but also moral beliefs, categories of kinship, religious be-
liefs, and numerous others—exhibit a long-term, population-level stability that demands 
explanation (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, p.56-60; Morin, 2015; Charbonneau, 2020). Inspired 
by examples such as these, we believe that cultural stability is best understood as a graded, 
population level phenomenon, and we operationalise it as such in the models below. It is 
graded because traditions can be more or less stable (they can change and vary to different 
degrees) and can be stable over either short or long timespans; and it is a population level 
phenomenon because it is best described as the product of many relatively autonomous 
items of different variants, with the frequency of variants changing over time (“ opulation 
 h      ”: Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Claidière et al., 2018). The question is, what makes 
cultural stability possible in the first place? We shall suggest that convergent transfor-
mations are likely to be a crucial part of the answer. 
 Convergent transformation occurs whenever one item causes the production of an-
other item whose form tends to deviate from that of the original item in non-random way. 
As a simple example, consider language borrowing. Words from one language are some-
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times used by speakers of another, and as part of this process the words are often modified 
in small and unconscious ways, and not necessarily at random. Rather, many of the modifi-
cations tend in particular directions, so that the words better fit the new linguistic environ-
ment. To take just one specific example, when English words are adopted for use in Hawai-
ian, they are commonly transformed in ways that better fit Hawaiian phonology. English /b, 
f/ become Hawaiian /p/; /v/ becomes /w/; /r/ becomes /l/; /ŋ/ becomes /n/; and /t, d, θ  ð, 
s, z, ʃ, tʃ, dʒ, k, g/ all merge as /k/ (see Andersson et al.                   h    x            
 h                  h       d           h    d   h                        h   d 
                    h ‘    ’ has been adopted in many languages, but its meaning has been 
transformed in slightly different ways in different places, each convergent on local distinc-
tions between different types of eateries. These examples are linguistic, but a great deal of 
empirical data shows clear evidence of convergent transformation in a wide range of other 
cultural domains (e.g. Nyhof and Barrett, 2001; Morin, 2013; Gandon et al., 2014; Miton et 
al., 2015; 2020; Strachan et al., 2020; see also Tennie et al., 2020 on ape culture). 
Importantly, convergent transformation is an abstract notion, defined functionally. 
As such, it does not include specific assumptions about either (i) the psychological processes 
that generate cultural transmission in the first place, or (ii) the factors that can generate 
convergent transformations and influence their direction. In other words, convergent trans-
formations can be realised in many different ways, as we elaborate below. This generality 
follows from how we have characterised the notion, in terms only of the relationship be-
tween input and output. 
Regarding (i), convergent transformation can occur as the output of many different 
psychological processes. It can occur as the output of simple observation, as in the case of 
stimulus enhancement (in which observation of an action raises, for an observer, the sali-
ence of the object of that action), or as the output of more clearly interactive means of cul-
tural transmission, such as active teaching, ostensive communication, and others. To avoid 
conflating our approach with any particular means of cultural transmission, the models be-
low use neutral language—such as ‘     ’ rather than, say, ‘              ’—throughout. 
Regarding (ii), the factors that can generate convergent transformations, and influ-
ence their direction, are many and varied. In particular, they can be both psychological and 
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ecological (Sperber, 1996; Morin, 2015; Scott-Phillips et al., 2018). Psychological factors are 
cognitive competencies, preferences and dispositions, and also both currently and previous-
ly held beliefs, acquired skills, know-how, memories, and other psychological phenomena 
held by a host (i.e., a biological individual) that affect whether and how a cultural item is 
processed by that host. Ecological factors are, in contrast, those factors in the shared local 
environment relevant to cultural dynamics. They include the biological and physical envi-
ronment external to the organism (food and materials) and also behaviours and artifacts, 
including public representations such as speech, writings, and ritual performances, through 
which people interact with one another. The empirical impact of both types of factors on 
processes cultural evolution has now been experimentally documented many times (for 
psychological factors see e.g., Kalish et al., 2007; Miton et al., 2015; Scott-Phillips 2017; gor 
ecological factors see e.g., Schillinger et al., 2014; Miton et al., 2020). 
As such, convergent transformation is a general notion that is not equivalent to any 
of the notions currently common in the cultural evolution literature. It is different to trans-
mission biases, because transmission biases act as a selection process (some content is 
more likely to be transmitted than others), while convergent transformation is a source of 
variation (some content is more likely to be altered in some ways rather than others). Con-
vergent transformation is also different to random copying error, or cultural ‘        ’  be-
cause with convergent transformations some ‘      ’ forms are more probable than oth-
ers, and not necessarily in the direction of greater adaptiveness. In this sense, convergent 
transformation is somewhat analogous to mutation biases in biological evolution (see Yam-
polsky and Stoltzfus, 2001; Stoltzfus, 2006; Stoltzfus and Yampolsky, 2009). Finally, conver-
gent transformation is different to guided variation, to which it has been sometimes com-
pared (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015). The main difference is that 
guided variation is used to describe psychological processes of individual learning leading 
(‘   d   ’  to fitness enhancement (Richerson and Boyd, 2005), whereas convergent trans-
formation is a stochastic process that can arise in many ways, and as such need not entail 
hill-climbing, and need not depend on intelligence, insight or innovation. (Note that some 
accounts of guided variation downplay its directional aspect, making them, in this respect, 
more similar to convergent transformation, e.g., Mesoudi, 2011; Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015.) 
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The notion of convergent transformation can thus contribute to the development of 
models of cultural evolution that, while retaining their basic evolutionary nature, are more 
general than models based on a stricter adherence to the Darwinian approach (Claidière et 
al., 2014). Specifically, we present a series of stochastic simulations that compare and con-
trast the effects of convergent transformations with the effects of other hypothesized caus-
es of cultural stability, in particular those inspired by the comparison with biological evolu-
tion such as faithful transmission (copying), random error, and transmission biases. In this 
way our models complement some other, ongoing research agendas, namely those that ex-
amine how convergent transformation and selection can interact with one another 
(Claidière and Sperber, 2007; Claidière, 2009; Claidière et al., 2018), and how convergent 
transformation influences the subsequent co-evolution of culture and cognition (Kirby, et 
al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2008; Thompson et al. 2016). 
More generally, formal models serve a range of scientific, epistemic, and philosophi-
cal purposes, from abstract ‘     -of-       ’ models that specific and test the internal log-
ic of verbal argument, to models that simulate specific empirical processes, sometimes gen-
erating quantitative predictions as a result (Frigg and Hartmann, 2020). Our Models 1 and 2 
aim at the first of these goals (see Servedio et al., 2014 on the importance and utility of 
proof-of-concept modelling). That is, they test the internal logic of previous verbal and phil-
osophical arguments about the cognitive foundations of culture and cultural transmission 
(see also Boyd and Richerson, 1987; Lewens, 2015). In Model 3, we extend our approach to 
generate a rubric for identifying cases of cultural transmission where convergent transfor-
mation is likely to have played a significant role, based on its signature in empirical records. 
 
Methods 
 We first describe the general methods that apply to all our simulations. Code for all 
models is available in an Open Science Framework repository at https://osf.io/yncws/ 
We consider populations of items in a variation space (inspired by Sperber, 1996, 
chapter 5) with each axis representing a continuous arbitrary feature of a cultural item. This 
could be, for instance, the size and width of an arrow-head (as in e.g. O'Brien et al., 2016); 
different features of rhymical structure in music (as in e.g. Miton et al., 2020; Strachan et 
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al., 2020); or the form and meaning of a word (as in many language evolution experiments, 
see Tamariz, 2017 for a review). We consider a population of N items. (In Model 1 and Mod-
el 2, N = 100. In Model 3, N = 10; 100; 1000.) At the beginning of each simulation, items are 
randomly placed in a continuous bidimensional (square) space with coordinates in the range 
[−   1]. At each timestep, the original population of items is replaced by a population of new 
items of equal size N. The location of each item at time t+1 is determined by applying a sto-
chastic transformation function that takes the location of an item at time t as input, and we 
study the evolution of the location of these items over time. 
The process proceeds through three ordered stages. 
(1) Sample population. For each item at t+1, the population at t is sampled in one of 
two ways, either random or biased. 
• Random sampling. One item from the population at time t is sampled at random and 
used as input for the transformation function.  
• Biased sampling. Two items from the population at time t are sampled at random, and 
whichever is closest to the origin (0, 0) (the centre of the space) is used as input for the 
transformation function. This effectively represents a selection process in which variants 
closer to the origin are fittest. The overall space can be understood, in this case, as a 
continuous, smooth fitness landscape with a single peak at the origin. (An alternative 
approach, more similar to classical model in population genetics, could be to sample N 
items from the previous generation by drawing each item with a probability proportion-
al to their distance from the origin.) 
 (2) Apply transformation function. New items undergo one of two transformation 
functions, either random or convergent. For each new item, both its distance from, and an-
gle relative to, its input is determined by probability distributions, as follows (see also Figure 
1). 
• Random transformation. The location of the item at t+1 is equal to the location of its in-
put modified by a distance δr and an angle βr: 
• δr is drawn from a lognormal distribution with σ=1 and μ=0, rescaled to a range 
[0,k], where k is a parameter of the simulation. k can be thought of, intuitively, 
as the maximum possible ‘copying error’ (but this gloss should not be interpret-
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ed as entailing any assumption that cultural transmission entails cognitive pro-
cesses of ‘copying’; see above). 
• βr is drawn from a uniform distribution in the range [−π, π] radians with 0 ori-
ented towards the origin. Because this distribution is uniform, the angle be-
tween an item at time t+1 and its input at time t is random. 
• Convergent transformation. The location of the item at time t+1 is equal to the location 
of its input at time t modified by a distance δc and an angle βc, as described below.  
• δc is drawn from a uniform distribution in the range [0, 2d], with d being the dis-
tance of the input to the origin. This means that the distance between an item 
and its input is a function of the distance between the input and the origin. The 
closer an input is to the origin, the smaller the distance between it and the item 
at t+1 will be.  
• βc is drawn from a normal distribution in the range [−π, π] radians with σ=1 and 
μ=0, and with 0 oriented towards the origin. Because this distribution is normal, 
the direction between an item at time t+1 and its input at time t is not random. 
Instead, items are most likely to be located closer to the origin rather than away 
from it.  
In case the final location of an item results out of the boundaries of the variation space, 
the transformation function is repeated until the item falls within it. Different ways to 
handle these occurrences do not change our results. 
These various functions reflect empirical aspects of the different processes by which stabil-
ity might be achieved. For random transformations, δr is defined as a lognormal distribution 
to reflect the idea that while most copying errors are small, exact replication is a marginal 
case; and βr is defined as a uniform distribution to reflect the idea that ‘              ’ are 
undirected. These two ideas are both common in the cultural evolution literature. For con-
vergent transformation, δc is defined in terms of d to reflect the idea that similarity be-
tween items and their inputs is not a fixed quantity, as it usually is with copying-errors, but 
traits tend to transform more or less over time in virtue of their properties (Sperber, 2000; 
Mesoudi and Whiten, 2004; Scott-Phillips, 2017), in our case represented by their location in 
the variation space. To help understanding the effect of convergent transformation, Figure 2 
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Figure 1. Transformation function. The input is depicted with a filled circle and the output with a 
cross. The transformation function determines a distance and an angle (see main text). The distance, 
δ, is measured absolutely (left panel), whereas the angle, β, is measured relative to a straight line 
between input and origin (right panel). 
 
Figure 2. Convergent transformation. Representative distribution of items (N=10,000) after conver-














 (3) Iterate and measure. Items of time step t are removed, and the items from time 
step t+1 serve as the inputs for the next time step. Once the location of each item at t+1 is 
set, we measure two aspects of the evolution of the system: stability and similarity.  
• Stability. We take two types of measures relevant to stability: (i) change in geometric 
centre of the population i.e. the mean trait value; (ii) spread of the population. Mean 
trait value is the most common measure in evolutionary biology (Hartl and Clark, 1997). 
Correspondingly, it is often the only measure of stability used in studies of cultural evo-
lution. However, (i) and (ii) are both are important as they can vary independently, and 
both are relevant. For example, in cases of disruptive selection, or stabilizing selection, 
the geometric centre could remain the same while the spread would change. For in-
stance, polarisation in political views may not be captured by looking only at the mean 
expected value: to capture such changes properly, spread must also be measured. As 
such, ignoring either measure could lead to missing some important forms of evolution-
ary change. 
• Stability is best understood in light of both measures. 
(i) We measure the change in geometric centre over time by calculating the cen-
troid of the population and then calculating the Euclidean distance between the 
centroids at two different intervals. These intervals are either 1 time step apart 
or 100 time steps apart. 
(ii) The spread of the population is a measure of the clustering of the items at a giv-
en time step. This is defined as the average distance of all items from the cen-
troid of the population (the second moment of our distributions). 
 Similarity. The degree of similarity between an item and the input it was produced from 
is measured as the Euclidean distance between them. Similarity at the level of the popu-
lation is then the mean of these distances for all items in the population. This measure is 
used in Model 3 only, where we investigate whether different possible causes of stability 
have different evolutionary signatures at the level of the population 
 
Results 
Stability without copying or selection (Model 1) 
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We first investigate the different conditions under which cultural stability obtains, or not. 
We compare five conditions (N = 100 in all cases), as below. In this way we are able to di-
rectly compare the effects of different sampling and transformation functions on the behav-
iour and, in particular, the stabilization of the evolving population. 
(a) Baseline. The location of all items at each time step is determined wholly at random 
i.e. there is no sampling or transformation, and hence no relationship between the 
population at time t and time t−1. 
(b) Replication. Random sampling with no transformation. 
(c) Unbiased. Random sampling with random transformation, under three distinct values 
of k (k = 0.01; 0.1; 0.5). 
(d) Biased Sampling. Biased sampling with random transformation, under three distinct 
values of k (k = 0.01; 0.1; 0.5). 
(e) Convergent Transformation. Random sampling with convergent transformation.  
Figure 3 summarizes the behaviour of the model under the different conditions described 
above. All results presented are an average of 10 runs of simulations. Videos of representa-




Figure 3. Output of Model 1. Each row represents a different set of 10 simulations, and each column 
measures a different aspect of cultural stability. Simulations from top to bottom: (a) Baseline; (b) 
Replication; (c) Unbiased; (d) Biased Sampling; (e) Convergent Transformation. Measures of stability, 
from left to right: (i) Spread; (ii) Change in geometric centre across 1 time step (simulation ran for 
15 
100 time steps); (iii) Change in geometric centre across 100 time steps (simulation ran for 10,000 
time steps). All results are averaged over 10 runs of simulations. The shaded area shows standard 
deviations. In all conditions N = 100. 
 
 The results highlight two particularly relevant aspects of cultural stability. First, a 
population under convergent transformation alone (Figure 3, row (e)) achieves stability. 
Both spread and change in geometric centre decrease asymptotically towards 0, and remain 
there. These results are robust to changes regarding the multiplier of d used to calculate the 
range of the uniform distribution from which δc is drawn, and the variance of the normal 
distribution from which βc is derived (see Supplementary Information). The result shows 
that neither high-fidelity transmission nor selection are necessary for stability: convergent 
transformation can be sufficient on its own. While cultural evolutionists would agree that 
stability can be brought about by other forces, in practice many models assume that high-
fidelity copying and selection are the necessary engines behind it. This result thus under-
mines assumptions that have been and continue to be influential in the cultural evolution 
literature, as we detailed in the Introduction. Arguments to this effect have been made ver-
bally, but formal demonstration makes the rationale explicit and facilitates direct compari-
sons (such as those we present in Models 2 and 3).  
Second, a population under random transformation achieves stability only when 
coupled with a biased sampling process. In ‘       d’  in which sampling is random, there is 
short- but not longer-term stability, even when k is extremely low, such as in k = 0.01 (re-
sults not shown). Indeed, geometric centre drifts through time: although there is very little 
change in geometric centre between two close time steps (1 or 100), over the long-term 
small changes in mean trait value add up, producing drift as an outcome. In other words, 
high-fidelity transmission produces long-term stability only when coupled with selection. 
This is, we note, similar to a standard result in population genetics, and employed in molec-
ular evolution, where the observations of abnormal evolutionary stabilities in molecular se-
quences are used as evidence of the effects of selection (see Millstein, 2002 for discussion). 
 
Mixing random and convergent transformation (Model 2) 
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In Model 1, convergent transformation was sufficient to produce stability on its own. In real-
ity, we might expect high-fidelity copying and convergent transformation to act on different 
items to a various degree. Indeed, the relative importance of high-fidelity copying and con-
vergent transformation is debated (e.g. Claidière and Sperber, 2007; Acerbi and Mesoudi, 
2015). To clarify these issues, we develop a model mixing both types. 
Specifically, we constructed a model with random sampling and a function that de-
termines which type of transformation—random or convergent—will occur. The probability 
that the transformation will be convergent is equal to 1 − dα, where d is the Euclidean dis-
tance between the input and the origin (scaled between 0 and 1), and α is a parameter of 
the model ranging between 0 and ∞  Otherwise, the transformation is random. Thus, the 
closer an input is to the origin, the more likely that transformation is convergent. A high α 
increases the overall probability that an item is transformed directionally instead of ran-
domly. As α decreases, so does the overall probability that an item is transformed in a con-
vergent rather than random way. α = 0 reduces to condition (c) in Model 1 (‘       d’   and 
α = ∞ reduces to condition (e) (‘                         ’   Note that other functions re-
lating α and d to the probability that a transformation will be convergent could be employed 
to model specific empirical phenomena. 
Results show that in situations where there is both convergent transformation and 
high-fidelity copying (intended here as a property of the transformation mechanism itself, 
or “             d     ” in Charbonneau, 2020), these two factors end up reinforcing one 
another to secure stability at the location where convergent transformation alone (and not 
copying alone) would have stabilized the population. This occurs even with high values of k 
(e.g. k = 0.5), where unbiased copying alone would not produce a stable population (see fig-
ure 3 (c)). Interestingly, the proportion of items that undergo convergent transformation is 
higher when k is lower than when it is higher. That is, convergent transformation, keeping α 
constant, is more common when copying ‘      ’ are smaller (Figure 4). This is because once 
an input is brought within the vicinity of the origin, future items are more likely to remain 
within that vicinity, and thus subject to convergent transformation, when k is low than when 
it is high. In short, although convergent transformation and high-fidelity copying work to-
gether to secure stability, it is convergent transformation that drives the effect. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of items that, at each time step, are subject to convergent transformation in 
Model 2, with α = 0.1 and different copying fidelity (k = 0.1; 0.5). Results are averaged over 10 runs 
of simulations, all with N = 100. The shaded area shows standard deviations. 
 
The findings of Models 1 and 2 open up questions of high relevance to the empirical 
study of culture. Since stability can be achieved in more than one way—by high-fidelity cop-
ying and selection, or by convergent transformations—how might we differentiate between 
these different possible causes? Is there a way to identify, in empirical records, whether one 
or the other of the different processes we have modelled is in fact at play in a given case? 
Model 3 investigates these questions. 
 
Evolutionary signatures of different causes of stability (Model 3) 
Here we investigate whether different possible causes of stability have different evolution-
ary signatures at the level of the population. To do this, we study how a population with a 
limited spread and far from the centre of the variation space (i.e. far from the equilibrium 
point) evolves over time. To cluster the population, we started the simulation by first locat-
ing the items in one of the four corners (chosen at random, with a 0.8 distance from the 
origin for both x and y coordinates, and randomly distributing the items within 0.05 distance 
from that point). We ran conditions ‘B    d         ’ (with k = 0.1; 0.5) and ‘           
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              ’ with this new starting setup. To examine how populations evolve towards 
the origin, we track similarity between items and their inputs. As in previous models, N = 
100. We also investigate the impact of population size, and we repeat the above process for 
three different population sizes (N = 10; 100; 1000). We measure how many time steps it 
takes for the populations to reach a stable state, which we operationalize as a change in ge-
ometric centre at each time step less than or equal to 0.01. 
Fidelity. In ‘B    d         ’ the mean distance between items and inputs (or “  i-
sodic   d     ” in Charbonneau 2020) is relatively low (depending on k) and remains so 
throughout the simulation (see Figure 5a). This is due to constant rate of random transfor-
mations, which derive from the assumption that transmission processes possess a specific 
degree of fidelity. This is how it is characterized in the theoretical literature, and imple-
mented in other models (see Charbonneau, 2020 for critical discussion). In contrast, in ‘  n-
vergent               ’ we observe at first a high distance between items and their inputs 
(i.e., a low degree of similarity) and then a rapid decrease of distance (see Figure 5a). This is 
because the expected degree of similarity is not fixed, but instead depends on the specific 
location of the input. This represents the idea that that the degree of fidelity by which a cul-
tural trait is transmitted is not an intrinsic property of some underlying transmission pro-
cess, but it can depend on the specific content under transmission (Acerbi and Mesoudi, 
2015; Charbonneau, 2020; Charbonneau and Bourrat, 2021). In particular, the further from 
the origin an     ’  input is, the less similar we can expect the item to be from the input. 
Qualitatively, in the ‘B    d         ’ case the population moving together, in small steps, 
until it reaches the origin, producing a gradual evolution akin to a hill-climbing behaviour. In 
contrast, in the case of ‘                         ’ the population rapidly converges on 
the origin, in what can be described as a ‘j      ’ behaviour, with little effect of cultural 
inertia. See videos SM5 and SM6. Notice that, while smaller values of d could make the 
‘                         ’ case appear qualitatively similar to a hill-climbing behaviour, 
large values of k would not produce a ‘j      ’ behaviour for ‘B    d         ’  since the 
population will not be subsequently stabilized in the origin.    
Population size. By varying population size, we observe that the two different condi-
tions show very different sensitivity to population size (Figure 5b). There is no evidence of 
sensitivity to population size in ‘                         ’  but there is in ‘B    d Sam-
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     ’  with larger populations taking less time to reach the same degree of stability as 
smaller ones. This dependency on population size occurs because biased sampling is, fun-
damentally, a sorting process dependent on sample size: it is more likely to sample one item 
closer to the origin in a large population than in a small population.  
 
 
Figure 5. Population-level similarity (a) and effects of population size (b) in Model 3. (a) Similarity 
between items and their inputs. ‘B    d         ’ with k = 0.1 and ‘                         ’ as in 
Study 1. Results are averaged on 10 runs of the model. The shaded area shows standard deviations. 
In both conditions N = 100. (b) Time to reach equilibrium for different population sizes. Measured 
for ‘B    d         ’ at two different levels of k (k = 0.1; 0.5) and for ‘                         ’  
Results are averaged on 10 runs of the model. Bars show standard deviations. 
 
In sum, we identify two evolutionary signatures that can distinguish between differ-
ent causes of cultural stability. First, there are qualitative and quantitative differences in the 
behaviour of the population as it converges on a stable form. Specifically, the similarity be-
tween items and respective inputs is constant with biased sampling, but variable with con-
vergent transformation. Second, there are differences in sensitivity to population size. Spe-
cifically, there is sensitivity to population size only in the case of biased sampling, but not in 




 In the Introduction we said that one important motive for examining the population-
level effects of convergent transformation was to address the question of whether the evo-
lutionary behaviour of a system governed by copying and selection can be obtained by other 
means, opening the door for alternative, yet potentially complementary frameworks. Many 
distinct research traditions, across evolution, psychology, and anthropology, have either ar-
gued or assumed that cultural stability, whether over shorter or longer timespans, requires 
psychological mechanisms (e.g. imitation) capable of copying cultural items with some high 
degree of fidelity (e.g. Mesoudi, 2011; Legare and Nielsen, 2015; Henrich, 2015). Are they 
correct to do so? 
 We have shown that the observation of cultural stability does not necessarily imply 
the existence of copying mechanisms. In particular, Model 1 shows that stability can emerge 
in an evolutionary system by virtue of convergent transformation alone, in the absence of 
any form of copying or selection process. This effect is robust to a sensible range of parame-
ter values and is not idiosyncratic. It follows that the emergence and long-term persistence 
of cultural traditions does not necessarily require any processes of transmission whose 
proper (evolved) function is high-fidelity transmission of cultural information. High-fidelity 
copying is therefore but one of several factors that can ensure intergenerational stability in 
an evolutionary system (see also e.g. Griffiths et al., 2008; Acerbi et al., 2012; Dean et al., 
2014). Cultural traditions can also emerge and remain stable as a consequence of any social 
process—of which there are many—that produces convergent transformation.  
 Notice the way we implemented convergent transformation in our model cannot be 
equated with a form of (even imprecise) copying. While it is true that the items taken as in-
puts are in a causal relationship with the items produced as outputs, this is a necessary con-
dition for any population to evolve from a time t to a time t+1 (contrast with Model 1 condi-
tion (a) where there is no such causal relation). However, convergent transformation, in our 
model, differs from a process of copying, as it is usually modelled in cultural evolution, in at 
least three respects. First, it is context sensitive, i.e., the amplitude and directionality of ex-
pected change depends on the value (position) of the inputs, while copying is context insen-
sitive: copying occurs in the same way independently of what the input is. Second, the mod-
ifications are not random, i.e., the final position of the items tends to diverge from the posi-
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tion of the inputs in a directed manner, while copying errors are random. Third, for copying, 
transformations (copying errors) tend to be modelled as small, in a mutation-like manner. If 
a copying process is to be successful, the copy will show little change from the input it was 
created from. By contrast, in convergent transformation, modifications can be large (jump-
like), depending on the position of the input (again, because of content sensitivity). 
These points have previously been argued for mostly in a verbal way (e.g. Sperber, 
2000; Claidière and Sperber, 2010; Morin, 2015; Charbonneau, 2020; Love and Wimsatt, 
2019; for other formal treatments see Claidière and Sperber, 2007; Claidière, 2009; Claidière 
et al., 2018; Morgan and Thompson, 2020). Here, following a conceptual elaboration of con-
vergent transformation, we have subjected these previous arguments to formal probing in 
highly general ways, made them comparable with concurrent models, and found the argu-
ments robust. We are thus presenting a precise challenge to many existing assumptions 
about the extent of the analogy between biological and cultural evolution (see also e.g. 
Dennett, 2006; Claidière and André, 2012; Lewens, 2015; Driscoll, 2017; Nettle, 2020). Some 
loosening of the Darwinian analogy, greater than most existing frameworks presuppose, is 
justified. 
At the same time, models based on convergent transformation still maintain the de-
sirable features of the models based on the standard analogy. In particular, they are popula-
tional, and can still realise a form of mindless variation-introduction, in which properties of 
the system that are observable at the population level need not be instantiated at the indi-
vidual level (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Claidière et al., 2014). That is, even without a strict 
Darwinian framework, cultural evolution can still produce a ‘                ’ that outsmarts 
single individual brains (Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016; Dennett, 2017). In addition, con-
vergent transformation allows in principle for a very large suite of factors that can influence 
the population-level outcomes. As we discussed in the Introduction, our models do not im-
plement specific psychological processes: while universal cognitive tendencies, often inves-
tigated in evolutionary psychology, can and do exemplify possible factors that guide conver-
gent transformation, many other factors, including ecological ones, can also do so (see e.g. 
Miton et al., 2020 for experimental demonstration). 
 A further important issue is the combined effect of high-fidelity copying and conver-
gent transformation when they act together in an evolutionary system (Model 2). Previous 
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models have shown that, when copying is biased, and the biases act in the same direction of 
convergent transformation, the effects will reinforce each other (Henrich and Boyd, 2002; 
Claidière et al., 2018). When instead the effects of copying biases and convergent transfor-
mation are in opposition, the end-state depends on the relative force of the two (Claidière 
and Sperber, 2007; Claidière et al., 2018). Given that, in our model, biased sampling and 
convergent transformation acted in the same direction, we analysed, with Model 2, the case 
of high-fidelity copying with unbiased sampling and convergent transformation. Intuitively, 
it might be expected that faithful unbiased copying will ‘    ’ items in a different point of 
the variation space with respect to where they would end if convergent transformation op-
erated alone (i.e., the attractor point), and that this effect would be stronger the more pre-
cise the copying. However, the results show that, the more faithful the copying, the stronger 
the effect of convergent transformation. Put simply, unbiased copying reinforces the only 
directional mechanism present, namely convergent transformation, making items close to 
the origin more stable than what they would be with less faithful copying. This suggests that 
convergent transformation, even when of low magnitude, can counteract—or might poten-
tially even dominate—the effects of other factors with shifting directionality (such as, for 
instance, model-based social learning strategies (Kendal et al., 2018)). 
Our results also identify two evolutionary signatures of different possible sources of 
stability in an evolutionary system, given that populations start far from the equilibrium 
point and need to explore the space to reach it (Model 3). The first signature concerns dif-
ferent levels of similarity while a population is undergoing change. Specific and clear exam-
ples can be widely seen in the experimental literature on language evolution, which consist-
ently shows the pattern observed for ‘convergent t             ’ in our Model 3. Levels of 
intergenerational similarity are at first low, when the languages are unstructured and rela-
tively inefficient, and later high, once the languages have evolved structure and greater lev-
els of communicative efficiency. Similar points apply to several other experimental datasets 
too, across a range of different cultural domains (Mesoudi et al., 2006; Lewandowsky et al., 
2009; Miton et al., 2015; Ravignani et al., 2016; Claidière et al., 2018). Our second evolu-
tionary signature is differential sensitivity to population size. Many recent studies investi-
gate the relationship between population size and the cumulative complexity of cultural 
items, in particular technology (Henrich, 2004; Powell et al., 2009; Querbes et al., 2014). The 
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hypothesis here is that larger populations increase rates of technological progress, because 
larger population ensure lower risks that cultural traits become rare and are lost. Our study 
adds to this literature an important additional finding about the relative rates of conver-
gence upon new cultural items. More generally, where the stabilization of a cultural item in 
a population is influenced by the size of that population, this may be interpreted as (partial) 
evidence that biased selection and copying plays a role; and conversely where there is no 
such relationship, convergent transformation is likely to be more important (Acerbi et al., 
2017). A similar pattern has been recently highlighted in a comparable model (Mesoudi, 
2021), suggesting that the analysis of the relationship between the effect of demographic 
features on cultural dynamics and the respective role of selection and convergent transfor-
mation represents a fruitful avenue for future empirical studies.  
More broadly, our simulations also contribute to the formal modelling of cultural at-
traction. At root, Cultural Attraction Theory argues that convergent transformations are a 
common and ordinary feature of human interaction; and hence that cultural fidelity and cul-
tural stability are best seen as emergent properties at the population level, with many pos-
sible local causes: “         causality is            ” (Sperber and Claidière, 2006, p.22; see 
also e.g. Sperber, 1985; 1996; Claidière and Sperber, 2007; Claidière et al., 2014; Morin, 
2015; Heintz, 2017; on cultural fidelity see Charbonneau, 2020). Our models make these 
claims more precise, and hence advance recent debate about whether Cultural Attraction 
Theory might provide a productive framework for studying culture from a naturalistic per-
spective (e.g. Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015; Sterelny, 2017; Buskell, 2017; Scott-Phillips et al., 
2018). 
One question is why, if convergent transformations are so ubiquitous, there is still 
cultural change and variation. Indeed, our models show how convergent transformations 
can quickly cause populations to converge and then be stable in perpetuity; but if that is 
correct, why do cultural phenomena still change over time, even if just gradually so? In an-
swering this question, two features of convergent transformation are especially important. 
First, convergent transformations are stochastic (and cultural attraction is hence probabilis-
tic and not deterministic; see Claidière & Sperber, 2007). Second, in any given case the fac-
tors relevant to transformations can be many, and the mix can vary from case to case. Our 
models implement just one factor in all cases, causing the items in the population to con-
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verge to one particular point in the space. However, in most real-world cases the factors 
that contribute to convergent transformation are multiple and they can themselves vary in 
time. Together with a degree of stochasticity, this diversity maintains variation in the popu-
lation, potentially at high levels. In consequence there will be, in any moderately complex 
system based on convergent transformation, a high sensitivity to initial conditions, and per-
sistent change alongside the stability that we have focused on here.  
More broadly, we note that by virtue of their generality (see in particular the section 
‘    ergent               ’   our models can be extended in many ways, to study cultural 
dynamics of many different types. Here we highlight three possibilities. (1) In our models, 
the convergent transformation function is oriented towards one single point in the space 
(the origin), but the model can be easily adjusted to include multiple points of convergence. 
(2) Similarly, the functions for convergent transformation and biased sampling are presently 
both oriented towards the same point in the space, but this can be easily altered by re-
defining one or the other to be oriented to some other point. (3) At present, the function 
that determines the distance covered by convergent transformation is defined in such a way 
that the closer an item is to the origin, the shortest the distance and vice versa. This could 
be modified in various ways, tailoring the model to specific issues.  
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